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The term „fundamentalism‟, broadly speaking, names today a religio-political 
perspective found in many if not all major religions in the contemporary world. Most 
disturbingly, it is associated with variant forms of religious extremism and thus 
religiously-oriented terrorism, in particular – though by no means exclusively – that of 
an Islamic ilk. Movements of a fundamentalist type are evident in Islam, certainly, but 
they may be found also in Christianity, in Hinduism, in Judaism and other religious 
communities. Contemporary fundamentalism is not the sole province of any one 
religion. And an upsurge in the totalising claims of fundamentalist ideologues, of 
whatever religion, together with the utilisation of globalized communication, 
transportation and related modern technologies, means that the issue of religious 
fundamentalism itself requires, once again, some careful attention.
2
 Although both 
Christianity and Islam are susceptible to imperialist impositions of one sort or another, 
as history only too clearly has demonstrated, it is nonetheless the case that Islamic 
modalities of terrorism have presently taken centre-stage in current world affairs. 
However, the religious fundamentalism with which Islamist extremism is associated 
arguably follows an identifiable paradigm that has a wider purview.  
 
Given the pressing need to be able to identify, predict, locate and so counter any 
potential terrorising extremism born of certain expressions of religion, then the task of 
analysing the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism so as to construct a heuristic 
paradigm capable of providing a measure of predictability would seem both obvious 
and urgent. In this paper I shall explore the nature of fundamentalism as such, examine 
fundamentalism and also terrorism in respect to Islam, then outline a paradigm of 
fundamentalism that, I contend, could enable the development of a predictive 





I suggest that „religious fundamentalism‟ denotes a worldview-type that can be found 
across different religions in the world of today. Specifically, the term denotes, as I will 
seek to demonstrate, a paradigm that paves the way for a shift in mentality from the 
relative harmlessness of an otherwise quaint, ultra-conservative – or in some apropos 
sense idiosyncratic relative to an orthodox „norm‟ – religious belief system; to a 
religiously motivated and fanatically followed engagement in aggressively 
impositional, even terrorising, activity. Understanding the structure, logic, and 
implementation of this paradigm is, I suggest, of vital importance in the endeavour to 
create any meaningful counter terrorist capability able to address religiously motivated 
and sourced terrorism.  
 
Fundamentalism  
The term „fundamentalism‟ and its usage arose in a uniquely Christian context, 
whence it has migrated into other arenas of discourse. A series of booklets, simply 
titled The Fundamentals, was published in America early in the twentieth-century to 
promote the view that there is a fundamental defining and non-negotiable set of 
traditional Christian doctrines. As a distinctive term, „fundamentalism‟ arose to refer 
to the generic idea proposed by the publication of the booklets. In an age where 
theological liberalism had been in the ascendancy, a fresh term enabled a new 
countering viewpoint to be identified and promoted.3 There was abroad the sense of 
needing to do battle royal for the fundamentals of the faith, and in this context the 
badge of fundamentalism was proudly worn. However, subsequent and wider 
application of the term has not been without problems and difficulties. It does not 
transfer well into religious contexts other than Christian, and it is imprecise enough 
even within the Christian camp. Nevertheless, it has gained wide coinage.  
 
In a nutshell, „fundamentalism‟ may be understood in terms of whatever it is „against‟. 
Often it is used as “a pejorative description for anyone who is regarded as having a 
closed mind with regard to a particular issue.”4 As a subject of critical academic 
scrutiny, fundamentalism, in its Christian context, has been the focus of a number of 
notable books and studies in the closing decades of the twentieth century.5 This has 
broadened out into studies on a wide-ranging front, inclusive of both religious and 
political variants of fundamentalism.6 The five-year „Fundamentalism Project‟ 
sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences has made a major 
contribution. This project commenced in 1987 and led, during the 90s, to the 
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publication of several substantial volumes of research output.7 More recently there 
have been a number of studies where the focus has been on Islamic fundamentalism.8 
The result of such academic development has been, among other things, to identify a 
number of generic elements or dimensions of fundamentalism per se. For example, 
Martin E. Marty observed that “fundamentalisms look backward and set out to 
„freeze‟ some moment, some event, some text or texts from the past as the perfect 
place in time or space from which to measure” life in the present.9 An imagined 
„golden-age‟, believed to have pertained at the religion‟s foundation, is held up as the 
model and reference point for contemporary reality. In response to the critique that 
religion, and in particular fundamentalist religion, is but an epiphenomenon riding on 
what are really political ideas and actions, or that fundamentalism is really just a 
passing fad, such studies have only served to highlight what subsequent history and 
recent events underscore: that religious fundamentalism is a deeply rooted 
phenomenon that can give rise to, rather than itself relies upon, political acts.  
 
One significant conclusion that arose from the Fundamentalism project was the 
recognition that fundamentalists 
 
fear loss and change through whatever serves to relativize the world and 
their worlds. There is constant fear of pluralism, or the stranger who brings 
other ways which may be alluring or threatening. … Pluralism confuses; it 
presents not only the threatening but also the attractive neighbour at hand, 




Furthermore, far from being archaic and fossilised, fundamentalist movements are 
instead “lively, intense, creative”, setting out to make a difference, indeed to change 
the world.11 Religious fundamentalism can imply a narrow, strict and limited 
metaphysics and set of doctrines, which to a greater or lesser degree hardly impinge 
on the wider life of a society; it can mean a worldview perspective that engenders, if 
not demands, the advocacy of a socio-political ordering and action to achieve an 
intended outcome. There is nothing startlingly new about that, of course. But the key 
difference between religiously-driven political actions today, in contrast with any 
previous point in history, is the pervasive context of globalisation. Instead of localised 
and regional levels of action, the technology and mentality of a globalized world now 
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allow for a degree of internationalisation of the ideologies and activities of 
fundamentalist movements as never before. 
 
Fundamentalism and Islam 
Bassam Tibi, an outspoken critic of much of contemporary Islam, was one of the 
researchers involved in the American Fundamentalism Project. Islamic 
fundamentalism, he says, 
 
strongly rejects (the) spirit of religious pluralism, dismissing it as a heresy 
threatening the neo-absolutist claim for the dominance of political Islam 
throughout the world. The intellectual father of Islamic fundamentalism, 
Sayyid Qutb who inspired Bin Laden, was also the one who claimed an 
Islamic world order to replace the present one. Fundamentalism is not only an 
intellectual challenge, it is a challenge to security inasmuch as it proposes to 
topple the existing order. … The challenge (is) a very concrete one posed and 
practiced by … jihad-fighters willing to sacrifice their lives.12 
 
Tibi further asserts: “There is a real challenge of fundamentalism as a threat that 
results in creating disorder. This challenge is not only posed to the West and to its 
civilization, but also to decent Muslims – men and women – who suffer the 
intolerance and totalitarian views and practices of the Islamists”.13 However, he views 
fundamentalism per se as primarily, if not solely, a political phenomenon that is first 
and foremost “an aggressive politicization of religion undertaken in the pursuit of 
nonreligious ends”. Thus, in his view, fundamentalism is only secondly and 
“superficially a form of terrorism or extremism”. Nevertheless he issues a salutary 
warning: 
 
In the long run the Islamic fundamentalists are far more dangerous as 
ideologues of power than as extremists who kill … Fundamentalism is a 
Weltanschauung, or worldview, that seeks to establish its own order, and thus 
to separate the peoples of Islamic civilization from the rest of humanity while 
claiming for their worldview a universal standing. … Islamic fundamentalists 
challenge and undermine the secular order of the body politic and aim to 
replace it with a divine order … Certainly Islamic fundamentalists will not be 
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able to impose their “order” on the world, but they can create disorder, on a 
vast scale.14 
 
Tibi views religious fundamentalism as a generic politicization of religion. Thus, in 
effect, he views fundamentalism as but one variety of a relatively new global 
phenomenon in international politics. He states: 
 
I identify religious fundamentalism not as a spiritual faith, but as a political 
ideology based on the politicizing of religion for sociopolitical and economic 
goals in the pursuit of establishing a divine order. … this ideology is 
exclusive, in the sense that it attacks opposing options, primarily those secular 
outlooks that resist the linking of religion to politics.15 
 
For him it is a political ideology, not the religion linked with the ideology, which is 
the point at issue. But it is the advocated assumption of a deep dichotomy between 
religion and politics which is problematic for much religious fundamentalism 
generally, and certainly for Islamic fundamentalism. Islam, broadly speaking, has ever 
championed an inherent linking of religion and politics: the necessary symbiosis of 
Islam as religion and Islam as civilization is the default position which Tibi seems to 
be overlooking. Certainly, as himself a devout Muslim, Tibi is deeply concerned about 
the identification of Islam, per se, with fundamentalism: “Islam as a religion is 
definitely not a threat, but Islamic fundamentalism is”.16 He is thus most concerned 
about the blurring of the distinction between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism in the 
media: “it is important to not only distinguish clearly between the two but also to 
make clear that the phenomenon [that is, religious fundamentalism as such] is not 
restricted to the Islamic world”.17  
 
Tibi sees current Islamic fundamentalism as an outgrowth of tensions that hold 
between the secular worldview of western cultural modernity and the monotheistic 
worldview of Islam. It is these tensions which can become a source of international 
socio-political conflict. Nevertheless it is an interpretation and application of religious 
sources that predominate in the forming of Islamist ideologies, and Tibi acknowledges 
that. As he notes, “In their writings … Islamic fundamentalists present themselves as 
true scripturalists, though they invoke the scriptures in a highly selective manner”.18 
Furthermore, such Muslim fundamentalists, he argues, “are not traditionalists; their 
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ideal is the selectively perceived and arbitrarily purified state of seventh-century 
Islam”.19 That Islamic fundamentalists go beyond the Qur‟an is given credence by an 
Egyptian example of a fundamentalist sheikh, or legal scholar, a “renowned authority 
on the Islamic concept of human rights” who declared in a fatwah of June 1993 – 
published in a London-based Arabic newspaper – that “every Muslim who pleads for 
the suspension of the shari‘a is an apostate and can be killed. The killing of those 
apostates cannot be prosecuted under Islamic law because this killing is justified”.20 
However, nowhere in the Qur‟an is there support for such a fatwah. “The command to 
slay reasoning Muslims is un-Islamic, an invention of Islamic fundamentalists”.21 
Tibi‟s critique is trenchant and far-ranging, although he does tend to gloss the 
religious basis and component of Islamic fundamentalist ideology. In the end I think 
he provides an example of the critical scholar who yet underplays the religious 
dimension. I suggest it is the ideology of religious fundamentalism as such that needs 
to be addressed if there is to be any sustained successful counter to the contemporary 
threat of Islamist terrorism, or indeed of any terrorism that arises out of, or in 
conjunction with, a particular religious milieu. 
 
Fundamentalism and Islamist Terrorism 
What 9/11, the subsequent bombings in Madrid, and more recently London 7/7, have 
revealed is that suicide-bombing Muslims, enacting out their warped jihad, are by no 
means the poor, oppressed, and dispossessed of this world. Whatever their lot in life 
they have been well educated for the most part; they have had sufficient affluence to 
travel with impunity; they have had access to sophisticated technology. Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the London bombings there is increasing evidence of the recruitment of 
affluent middle class Muslims in British universities to the radical Islamist cause. A 
joint Home Office and Foreign Office dossier on Young Muslims and Extremism 
places likely recruits in two categories: those well educated, especially in the 
engineering and IT (Information Technology) fields,22 together with those who may 
not be unintelligent, but who have emerged in their youth as underachievers, often 
having already come to the attention of authorities in relation to criminal activities.23  
 
Furthermore, the report claims that young professionals from privileged backgrounds, 
as well as students, “have become involved in extremist politics and even terrorism”. 
Such young Muslim men have enjoyed all the benefits and opportunities of the 
contemporary globalized industrialised world. These are not the warrior peasants of 
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old, intent on sweeping out the corrupt and decayed administrations in order to 
inaugurate a renewal of their society. There may have been an echo of that ancient 
Islamic paradigm motivating Pashtun tribesman of the Taliban. It is most certainly not 
the agenda of an al Qaeda terrorist cell. Extreme actions are not being called for in the 
name of a societal reformation and the overthrow of evil. Rather evil is being 
employed for no more reason, practically speaking, than a cruelly quixotic tilting at 
the windmill of Western society per se. As Johann Hari remarked of the July 2005 
London bombers, they “were not poor, they were not persecuted, they were not 
personally humiliated”.24 For Hari, any explanation of their actions can only lie in “the 
extraordinary power of political ideas”. But the political dimension is clearly 
embedded in the religious, as Hari implies: “With one leap of faith … they were 
soldiers in the International Jihad, doing the work of Allah himself to liberate Muslim 
peoples across the world.”25  
 
A template for this can be found in the three-way relationship between Britain, 
Pakistan and globalized Islamism. Muslims from England have been active in various 
Pakistan-based militant groups, engaged in a jihad in Kashmir, since the early 90s; the 
Kashmiri-focussed groups – whose jihad is against Indian occupation of Kashmir – 
later in the 90s established links with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Significantly, the 
clue to this linking is found in the shared Deobandi ideology of an “ultra-conservative 
strand” of Sunni Islam that in turn has links to the hard-line Wahhabi ideology 
emanating from Saudi Arabia. From this it is evident that some of these initially quite 
locally-focussed groups, in terms of the outworking of jihad, have now been linked to 
international terrorism: jihad is thus globalized, by virtue of the logic of extending 
jihad beyond a local context together with applying the logic of an ultra-conservative 
and militant form of Islam. Further, as the Observer report that discusses this 
development notes, modern globalized militancy works by way of “a long chain of 
personal and organisational associations”.26 Thus the difficulty in identifying and 
locating – let alone rooting out – potential terrorist groups before they act: there are 
few overt institutional or structural elements whereby such potential terrorists can be 
identified.  
 
The implication, of course, is that the first component in any countering strategy has to 
be in respect to identifying, and addressing, ideological rhetoric and elements within 
communities from which potential terrorists are likely to come, and by which they are 
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likely to be nourished. The war on terror is a war of ideology; in particular, it is a war 
against the dominance of certain religious fundamentalisms. Of course, by virtue of 
being “extremists”, the individuals who carry out terrorist atrocities are properly 
disowned by the community of faith with which they are otherwise identified. Their 
actions are condemned as un-Islamic, as contrary to Quranic dictate, and inimical to 
normative Islam. Alongside this rejection of aberrant behaviour there is also a direct 
and outright denial by some – possibly many – from within the Muslim community of 
any Islamic link to the situation in the first place. Attempts to redirect responsibility 
elsewhere, including claiming the attacks were the work of America or Israel, are not 
unknown. Such paradoxical and absolute denial of Islamically-driven terrorism, by 
Muslims, is based on an ideological stance which goes, in effect: “Given that such 
terrorism harms Muslims and besmirches Islam, any true Muslim could not possibly 
commit it.” This line of thought surfaced after the 9/11 attacks when a Muslim 
mentality of denial led to rumours of Jewish conspiracy theories as the root cause and 
not Islamic disaffection, let alone an Islamic ideology as such. Straws of denial and 
deflection are being desperately clutched at by some. As Waleed Aly remarks: 
 
An emotive confusion drives denial and this is demonstrated by the 
inconsistency of the reasoning that accompanies it. Too often, those who 
deny that Muslims are in any way responsible for terrorism also blame a 
belligerent Western foreign policy towards Muslim nations for the terrorist 
backlash. Such Orwellian doublethink destroys the necessary credibility to 
inspire honest engagement.27 
 
On the one hand there is a refusal, on ideological grounds, to believe fellow-Muslims 
could even commit such acts of terrorism; on the other hand Islamic extremists will 
target Muslim and non-Muslim alike on equally ideological grounds. One result is that 
the many moderate and peace-loving Muslims in western secularised communities 
“are just angry and tired of being held hostage by the acts of other Muslims”.28 So 
what is driving contemporary globalized Islamic extremism and terrorism? Is it just a 
contemporary socio-political aberration in a religious guise? Are these little more than 
the anarchists of our age?  
 
The joint report, referred to above, noted that among likely candidates for anarchic 
terrorist cells of the present-day Muslim variety are “loners” who gravitate to ethnic or 
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religious university clubs, or the like, and who also clearly register “disillusionment 
with their current existence”. The issue at this level is not with the clubs as such, but 
with the possible psychological profile of certain of their members. Neither of these 
variables, even taken together, would help to identify a potential suicide-bomber. 
However, the report goes on to identify the rhetoric of communal disillusionment as a 
third factor, noting in particular the oft-repeated disapproving response to the double 
standard attributed to “the foreign policy of western governments, in particular Britain 
and the US”. This may provide the prospect of a more obvious measure of discontent, 
except that there are many mainstream Christian Churches and their congregations 
which express similar critiques, cater for ethnic identities, are by definition „religious 
clubs‟, and very often encourage „loners‟ into their midst. Identifying a religious 
extremism inclining to criminal activity is not going to be easy. 
 
Arguably, when the matter of attending to public discourse is pressed, a potential 
measure of the propensity to terrorism can be identified in terms of a scrutiny of 
certain forms of Muslim rhetoric, namely when there is unequivocal advocacy of the 
view that, vis-à-vis an Islamic context, „passive oppression‟ – as evidenced within the 
UK, for example, by a foreign policy of non-action in Kashmir or Chechnya – has 
been eclipsed by an intentional „active oppression‟ against Muslims and Islam. That is 
to say, in regards to the advocating rhetoric, military interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the so-called „war on terror‟, or whatever else may be deemed to express „active 
oppression‟, may be taken by Muslims as, indeed, acts perpetrated against Islam per 
se. Acts against Muslims in a specific context are interpreted as acts conducted against 
Islam generally and universally, thereby calling forth and legitimating, qua the logic 
and rhetoric of jihad, an aggressive Islamic response. Where such rhetoric of advocacy 
and argumentation is fomented there may well be a case for pre-emptive countering 
action on the part of the authorities concerned. The problem, of course, is that such 
action only reinforces the rhetoric. 
 
It is certainly the case that Muslim tendencies to reform and modernise that emerged 
in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries have been eclipsed, in recent decades, by the 
rise of Islamism, and more latterly by globalized and internationalized Islamic 
extremism. Islamists assert Islam as a revolutionary idea and programme with the aim 
of utterly destroying the social structure of the world in order to build it anew. Jihad is 
thus revolutionary combat in a transcendent cause. In the view of such an extremist 
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perspective, Islam is not a matter of optional belief but is inherently a total and 
totalising socio-ideological system. Thus, the message of Islam is believed to have 
been addressed to all humankind. For the Islamist, this means every person who 
believes in the message becomes, ipso facto, a member of the „Islamic party‟ or the 
„party of God‟, which is engaged in an inherent struggle to put in place a new 
civilisation explicitly based on the „word of God‟. This is the essence of the paradigm 
that has motivated the pattern, found throughout Islamic history, of popular overthrow 
of Muslim governments deemed corrupt and un-Islamic: jihad is taken up as a tool of 
social salvation; deep disaffection finds resolution in assertive jihadic action. Jihad is 
viewed as a Muslim liberation struggle to be engaged in on multiple fronts, and 
terrorism becomes a legitimate tool of jihad. Or so the logic, born of the rhetoric, can 
go. And so religious terrorism derives from an ideology of religious fundamentalism. 
One political correspondent, writing in the aftermath of the 2005 London bombings, 
seemed to get the point when he noting that, rather than taking up arms in the so-
called “war against terrorism”, the real issue has to do with the “battle to discredit an 
ideology … it is an idea that caused the attack, and it is the idea that must be 
undermined”.29 And another Observer report noted that authorities are intent on 
“examining literature for clues to the precise ideology” that may have inspired the 
bombers.30 Investigations are said to have revealed that as far back as January 2005 
there was mounting concern within the young men‟s own Muslim communities that 
their hardening fundamentalist and extremist attitudes and opinions were taking them 
far beyond the pale of normative Islam. Indeed, they had been ostracised and told they 
were not welcome in certain mosques because of their advocacy of “inappropriate 
teachings”. Their “increasing fundamentalism” had estranged them from their own. 
Yet, local Muslim acquaintances could not foresee the possibility of terrorist action, 
suggesting that there is as yet a very real difficulty for religious people to understand 
the range of ideological options, and the significance of the shifts that occur in an 
individual‟s ideological stance, from within a given religion. This appears acutely the 
case for Muslim communities right now, but should in no way be deemed a uniquely 
Muslim issue. 
 
Religious Fundamentalism as a paradigm for terrorism 
Fundamentalism is both a specifically focussed mindset and a certain kind of narrow 
worldview, a modus operandi, which can apply to just about any sphere of human 
activity, but especially so to religion and politics, for both are concerned with the 
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context and aims of human existence. Fundamentalism, as a framework phenomenon 
that applies across more than just one religion, and which can be applied also to other 
non-religious spheres of human commitment and worldview, is marked, I suggest, by 
at least twelve key factors. Others may be adduced, but these twelve, and the way they 
are interconnected, need to be carefully understood. For it is these features, 
collectively and cumulatively that, I contend, move a fundamentalist mindset from the 
quirky to the critical, from atavism to aggression, from benign eccentricity to socially 
endangering activity. The factors comprise six sets of paired features, and it is the 
particular sequential combination which is important, not just the factors themselves. 
 
Set 1 – Principal Presuppositions:  
(i) Perspectival Absolutism and (ii) Immediate Inerrancy 
A fundamentalist perspective is inherently absolutist: all other relevant phenomena are 
explained on its terms or viewed in a relativising way with reference to it. 
Fundamentalism, as a mindset, is first and foremost a mentality that expresses the 
modernist project writ large: only one truth; one authority; one authentic narrative that 
accounts for all; one right way to be. And, of course, that way is my way, declares the 
fundamentalist. Further, a fundamentalist perspective deems itself privileged in 
respect to this absolutism, for it implies superiority of knowledge and truth. Indeed, 
this is inherent to holding an absolutist perspective as such. Absolutism of outlook or 
worldview is a mark of fundamentalism, but not of itself a signal of potential terror. 
 
Allied to absolutism is the view that the grounding text – be it political manifesto or 
holy writ – is to be read as conveying an immediate truth or value, without error; that 
is, it is inherently or effectively inerrant. However, the assertion of the immediate 
inerrancy of the text – namely reading the text as being immediately applicable and 
providing a non-mediated access to ultimate or divine truth – in fact involves an 
implicit assertion that there is only one normative interpretive reading allowed: that 
which is undertaken through the fundamentalist‟s lens. Now a fundamentalist‟s 
presumption of textual immediacy and inerrancy is, of course, but one interpretive 
option. Nevertheless, from the fundamentalist perspective, alternative and variant 
interpretations are deemed inherently false or heretical, and so are rejected: there can 




So far as religion is concerned, these two interconnected factors – perspectival 
absolutism and immediate inerrancy – comprise the foundational or principal 
presuppositions of a religious fundamentalism that, on their own, might simply 
indicate little more than one among many options for the expression of religious 
belief. Most often a secularist, an agnostic, or a religious liberal in the West would 
view these factors to be the essence of fundamentalism: an atavistic expression of 
religious thought, a quirky mindset, a rather odd out-of-step religious mentality; easily 
ignored, best avoided, of no consequence or significance in the greater scheme of 
things. But, I contend, this is not all there is to fundamentalism.  
 
Set 2 – Authority Derivation: 
(iii) Apodicity assumption and (iv) Narrow Narrative Indwelling 
Building directly upon the preceding set, the third and fourth factors together 
constitute the basis of authority claimed by fundamentalism as such, namely, in the 
first instance, the assumption that the authority source, most usually textual (though 
not necessarily scriptural: together with the relevant scripture there are many other 
possibilities of textual sources upon which a fundamentalist might rely), is 
unambiguous, thus requiring no interposing hermeneutic. This is sometimes 
understood in terms of „literalism‟, but for a fundamentalist the key issue is that the 
authority of the text is such that no intermediary interpretive framework is required – 
the text itself provides pellucid expression of truth, whether in terms of an abstract 
universal, or in respect to a pragmatic or programmatic articulation of the values and 
views espoused by the fundamentalist as the truth. This provides the authorisation 
underlying the preceding presupposition of immediate inerrancy.  
 
Paradoxically, of course, any so-called „literalist‟ reading, or regarding a text as not 
requiring intentional hermeneutical application, is itself a modality of interpretation, 
namely a fundamentalist one. It is often assumed, by a fundamentalist, that a „direct‟ 
reading of the text can be made so as to avoid the murky waters of interpretation. That 
is to say, there is no need to apply any sort of intellectual critique or scrutiny of the 
text: meaning can be immediately read off; the text at hand is clear in its composition; 
the message conveyed by the text is apodictic. Not so. The fundamentalist makes the 
assumption that meaning and truth can be directly read without recourse to a frame of 
meaning that supplies a key to understanding. Again, not so: every fundamentalist 
reading of the Bible, the Qur’an, or whatever, necessarily requires a prior-held 
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framework of understanding about the nature of the text and the meanings of the key 
terms and concepts employed.  
 
Nevertheless, allied to the assumption of apodicity is the factor of narrow narrative 
indwelling. Arguably all religious people „indwell‟, to a greater or lesser degree, their 
respective religious narrative. The life references, points of meaning, and various 
frameworks of understanding which inform a religious individual‟s existence are more 
often than not traceable to the paradigms, models, values etc that are given within the 
religious narrative – both the scriptural record as well as ancillary histories/stories and 
so forth – than derived from the intellectual ratiocination of doctrine and dogma. 
Where the narrative base is broad, the religious life that indwells therein likewise 
reflects breadth. But where the base is narrow, the resultant indwelt religious life is 
correspondingly confined. So, I suggest, in the case of fundamentalism a 
distinguishing factor has to do with the narrowness of narrative indwelling that is 
manifest. It is, indeed, this very narrowness which often marks a fundamentalist out 
from the wider religious tradition and community that might otherwise be regarded as 
conservative, for example. 
 
Set 3 – Contextual Scope:  
(v) Ideological Exclusivism and (vi) Polity Inclusivism 
Fundamentalism‟s third set includes two factors which, in their apparent paradoxical 
juxtaposition, yield the scope of the context of fundamentalism. The first is ideological 
exclusivism wherein, because there is only one reading, only one interpretation, of the 
grounding text allowed, the ideological view expressed therein, or built thereon, is 
inevitably an exclusive one. No competing or variant ideological view is granted 
credibility. A fundamentalist perspective will exclude, virtually automatically, 
anything that relative to it appears „liberal‟, that is, that admits of, for example, any 
limitation, provisionality, otherness, openness or change. Religious fundamentalism 
excludes religious liberalism. Similarly, secular fundamentalism often excludes 
religion per se on the same sorts of grounds. Ideological exclusivism works in 
multiple directions. 
 
But alongside this exclusivity there may be discerned, somewhat paradoxically, as a 
sixth factor to fundamentalism, a form of inclusion, namely polity inclusion. This 
refers to the propensity to include, in respect to considerations of the policies and 
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praxis of social organisation, all others that fall within the fundamentalist‟s frame of 
reference or worldview understanding. This may still appear innocuous, especially if 
the fundamentalists concerned are a minor or marginalised group in terms of the wider 
society in which they exist, or where such an inclusivist stance finds a more benign 
setting within a normative or orthodox religious tradition. Nevertheless, in terms of the 
paradigm analysis I am here pursuing, the fundamentalist for whom polity 
inclusiveness is a primary element is now poised to become activist – to act on this 
inclusivism in terms of polity, whether covertly (as in the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints vicariously baptising the dead) or overtly (as in the Taliban‟s 
insistence that everyone in Afghanistan live according to their application Islam, and 
variations on this theme found currently in parts of Pakistan and Nigeria). 
 
So, the apparent paradox of fundamentalism evincing both exclusivism and 
inclusivism as two of its core features is resolved. Excluding all other ideological 
variants and perspectives necessarily implies the wholesale inclusion of a society in 
terms of the outworking of polity considerations. Thus, for example, the 
fundamentalism of a resurgent Islamist perspective naturally insists not just that all 
Muslims should live according to Islamic Law, but that all members of the society in 
question, irrespective of religion, should likewise submit to this Law Code – 
understood, of course, to transcend human values and codes by virtue of being “God‟s 
law”. The imperative force of this element of fundamentalism means that all are 
expected automatically to submit – or be made so to do. We hear of this call being 
made by activists from time to time in different parts of the Islamic world; we may 
find some variant expressions of it closer to home, if only albeit wistfully, or merely in 
principle, entertained. 
 
Set 4 – Implicit Verification: 
(vii) Narrative Correlation and (viii) Rhetorical Corroboration 
Principal presuppositions granted, the derivation of authority established, and the 
contextual scope adumbrated, the evolving fundamentalist perspective begins now to 
move from a variant conservative expression of a religious worldview to a more 
intentional advocacy of religious outlook as being, par excellence, the expression of 
authenticity and truth applicable for all. This comes about, initially, with the 
deepening of the correlation between the religious narrative espoused and the reality, 
or sitz-im-leben, of the religious community concerned. Any phenomenology of 
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religion will be able to articulate some such measure of narrative correlation as an 
otherwise quite normal feature of religion as such. That is to say, normatively 
speaking a religion will proffer some degree of correlation between its narrative and 
the „real world‟ in which the followers of the religion live – otherwise religion would 
reduce to a simple and obvious fairy-tale superimposed upon the „real‟ world, or set 
aside from it. However, a distinction can be made between the broader traditions of a 
religion whose narrative correlation will be relatively loose, flexible or at least 
provisional, and the fundamentalist whose degree of correlation will be that much 
greater and intense. Indeed this factor sharpens – and is prefaced by – the elements of 
absolutism and inerrancy as adumbrated above. For a fundamentalist the correlation 
will be such as to yield an unambiguous outcome – America is the Great Satan, 
ontologically, for example – whereas, for a non-fundamentalist critical of the West, 
America may be deemed or judged satanic in a more general way. The difference is 
one of the supposed degrees of correlation between the religious narrative and the 
external realities of the world in which the fundamentalist lives. 
 
Allied, clearly, to the factor of narrative correlation is that of rhetorical corroboration. 
Here the discourse of fundamentalism can be readily tested. For in the articulation of 
narrative correlation there is likely to found a corresponding intensification of a 
corroborating rhetoric that situates, endorses, and justifies the fundamentalist 
perspective vis-à-vis the judgements and assessments made about the external world 
in terms of narrative correlation. Rhetoric will be sharp and self-affirming; judgements 
will be clear and reflective of both the correlation factor as well as the corroboration 
factor. Thus the perspective of the fundamentalist derives implicit verification and the 
scene is set for the next step, namely the application of the values espoused from out 
of the fundamentalist‟s narrative. 
 
Set 5 – Value Application: 
(ix) Otherness Negated and (x) Self-Superiority Asserted 
At this stage in the development of a fundamentalist‟s outlook the sense of self-
affirmation and confidence is such that the values of fundamentalism are actively and 
intentionally applied. And these values are primarily two: the negation of otherness or 
alterity per se, and the corresponding assertion of self-superiority over all opponents, 
real and putative. The negation of otherness is perhaps critical at this juncture for the 
scene set by the third set of factors – contextualising exclusivism and inclusivism – 
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now emerge into a devaluing and dismissal of the „other‟, whether in terms of rival 
community or competing alterities, ideological or otherwise. Indeed, such alterities 
may be – and in fact often are – demonised. The religiously „other‟ on this view is 
often cast as „satanic‟, or at least seriously and significantly labelled as a hostile 
opponent, and so hostilely regarded. 
 
In the process of negating the other, the self is asserted as inherently superior. My God 
is greater than your god. My Truth reigns over your ignorance. The authenticity of my 
faith contrasts with the feeble delusion you entertain. My laws express the divine 
reality directly which is infinitely superior to the laws which derive merely from 
human ideas. The salvation offered by my faith is the real thing by contrast to the lost 
way that you proclaim. And so we might go on. However it is expressed or referenced, 
it will be clear enough that the fundamentalist is applying the key value set of 
negativity to „otherness‟ and a corresponding assertion of self-superiority. The scene is 
now well set for the sixth and final set of factors I have analysed as the components of 
the paradigm of fundamentalism – the rendering of an explicit justification not just for 
a viewpoint but also for actions premised on that viewpoint. 
 
Set 6 – Explicit Justification:  
(xi) Sanctioned Imposition and (xii) Legitimated Extremism 
It should be clear that, once the preceding sets of factors are in operation, it is but a 
short step to the final two, which denote the expression of fundamentalism in some 
form of direct socio-political action. For the eleventh factor sees the very imposition 
of the fundamentalist‟s views and polity as, in fact, sanctioned by a higher or greater 
authority – whether that authority is conceived in terms of deity or the dynamics of 
historical necessity, or whatever. This reference transcends the local, particular, 
ordinary taken-for-granted freedoms of everyday life with the requirement to be, live 
and act, in accord with the fundamentalist‟s ideological dictates.  
 
The sanctioning of the imposition of the fundamentalist‟s programme leads naturally 
to the twelfth and final factor of this analysis: extremist action is now legitimated. 
Once there is in place a sense of transcendent sanction for programmatic action, the 
way to the legitimising of extreme behaviours in order to achieve the requisite 
outcomes, is eased. Japanese kamikaze pilots and Palestinian suicide bombers are two 
examples – now „classical‟ in terms of recent history – of the outworking of the 
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features of fundamentalism that culminate in extreme actions. More complexly, as we 
have recently seen in Afghanistan, not only was it the case that all good Muslims 
ought to submit naturally to the Shari’a, according to the fundamentalist ideals of the 
Taliban, but indeed all of society should be made to submit, like it or not, for 
impositional submission is an inherent element of Islamic extremism. Submission to 
the dictates of the fundamentalist is at this juncture a matter of necessary imposition, 
as Afghani women found to their cost, for example. And the alternative to even an 
involuntary submission is outright destruction: hence, from the Taliban‟s 
fundamentalist perspective, the Buddha „idols‟ had to be destroyed. How else does the 
fundamentalist ensure that the imposition that has been sanctioned can actually be 
effected? Sanctioned imposition and legitimated extremism are the two sides of the 
one coin in the currency of terror. 
 
Conclusion 
Fundamentalism is not simply a religious or political option in terms of belief 
perspective. It is a package-deal phenomenon marked by a sequence of factors whose 
cumulative impact can be devastating. The Taliban, to return to this example of 
extreme Islamist fundamentalism, took an absolutist, inerrant and exclusivist line with 
respect to religious identity and behaviour, which was extended to include all who 
were within their purview – namely, the inhabitants of Afghanistan. Actions taken to 
effect their aims were deemed sanctioned by the highest authority – Allah – and their 
extreme measures were in consequence deemed legitimated. Thus no opposition was 
brooked; all had to submit and obey, or face the consequences. 
 
Whether political or religious, of local or global scope, fundamentalism is a 
phenomenon to be seriously reckoned with. Religious fundamentalism, in the form of 
contemporary Islamism, is the seedbed of Islamic extremism and terrorism. To the 
extent my analysis of the paradigm of religious fundamentalism per se is in any way 
apposite and accurate, and to the extent that empirical evidence – for example from 
speeches, pamphlets etc. – can be adduced, from any given situation, such that there is 
a clear correlation with the above paradigmatic factors, then I suggest that the analysis 
provides a basis, at least, for an empirical measure for the detection, and so  hopefully 
countering, extremist religious fundamentalism – Islamic as well as any other – likely 
to lead to terrorist activity. Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly in the long 
run, such a paradigm analysis may assist in the task of tackling the ideology of 
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Islamist extremism head-on. A war on terror is inherently unwinable as a military 
exercise. It requires a change in mindset, in worldview, brought about by a shift in 
religious ideology, if the likelihood of terrorism emerging from within any religious 
community is to be successfully countered. Unmasking the underlying ideological 
framework of an extreme religious fundamentalism is the first step in formulating a 
countering ideology; developing it is a demanding challenge of interreligious and 
intercultural dialogical engagement. 
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